Prospects' Prospects: What Are the Chances of Success?

Overview/Objectives

Last winter I took an extensive look at the probability and level of success of top baseball prospects. I've sprinkled bits and pieces of my results in various forums but until now I haven't presented them as one more-or-less cohesive unit. Although some of the specifics may be different a year later, I believe the general findings are still relevant.

My intent, after determining the status of each prospect examined, was to look at such variables as position, original organization, etc., and also at trends in terms of advancing or declining status and see if I could find any patterns--what types of players are likely to stagnate at higher levels, which teams develop middle infielders the best, etc.

Some of these more advanced topics proved a bit more complex than I initially expected, and thus they are not presented here.

Methods

Data Pool

I used John Sickels' prognostications as the basis for my study, compiling a list of everyone who made his Top 50 list from 1996 to 2000 (plus his "honorable mentions" of 1999 and 2000, for a total of 196 players). Essentially, the pool comprised all players who had received a grade of B-plus or higher in any of Sickels' books from 1996 to 2000.

Status Assignation

Four knowledgeable baseball fans voted to determine the status (subjectively speaking, i.e., there were no set formulas in terms of OPS, RC/27, etc.) of each of these players entering the 2000 season. Of the 196 prospects, the status of 116 was agreed upon unanimously. Of the 80 that weren't, 67 were agreed upon by consensus. For the remaining 13, for whom the votes were split, I chose to err on the side of caution, assigning the lower category.

In terms of status categories, the guidelines I set forth are as follows:

• superstar: top 10%; Derek Jeter, Nomar Garciaparra, Scott Rolen
• star: next 20%; Johnny Damon, Ben Grieve, Bartolo Colon
• regular: full-time starter or closer; Neifi Perez, Todd Walker, Jason Schmidt
• backup/fringe: bench player or middle reliever; Karim Garcia, Amaury Telemaco bust: a guy who never made it or who futzed around for a while but left way before anyone expected, due either to ineffectiveness or to injury; Steve Gibralter and Trey Beamon are good examples of the former, while Paul Wilson and Ron Wright exemplify the latter
• prospect: a guy who hasn't made it yet but still has a chance to be a regular; Nick Johnson, Dernell Stenson, Wascar Serrano
• suspect: a guy who hasn't made it yet and who technically still has a chance to make it but realistically probably won't: Wes Helms, Cesar King

Results/Observations

Basic Findings

• In the period 1996-2000, prospects rated by Sickels as A or A-minus were almost twice as likely to hold regular big-league jobs as those rated B-plus (56% to 31%), and almost half as likely to be a bust (6% to 10%).
• There aren't a lot of highly touted second base prospects. Only 3 of the 196 players in the pool started out at second; two of them (Carlos Febles, Todd Walker) made it, the other (Arquimidez Pozo) didn't.
• Highly touted first basemen are about as likely to become big-league regulars as are right-handed pitchers (41% to 42%) but twice as likely to bust (18% to 9%).
• Left fielders are just as likely to become big-league regulars as they are to bust (13%), while right fielders are about 4 times as likely to succeed (62% to 15%) and center fielders about 11 times as likely to succeed (43% to 4%).
• Of players rated B-plus or higher in 1996, 50% (26 of 52) are now big-league regulars, while 31% (16 of 52) are busts. Those numbers for 1997 are 61% (35 of 57) and 9% (5 of 57); for 1998, 50% (27 of 54) and 6% (3 of 54); for 1999, 48% (29 of 60) and 0%; for 2000, 4% (2 of 54) and 0%.
• Overall, players rated by Sickels as B-plus or higher during the 1996-2000 period were roughly 3 1/2 times as likely to earn starting jobs in the big leagues as they were to bust (37% to 10%).

Data Solidification with the Passage of Time

One thing that appears pretty clear (and it's really very intuitive if you think about it) is that the data solidifies as time passes; i.e., the 1996 data are appreciably more reliable than the 1999 or 2000 data. We have a better idea of what kind of players these guys really are as their roles in the bigs become more clearly defined and they physically (and mentally) mature.

For example, if we look only at 1996 and 1997 prospect ratings, 34 of 47 (72%) of those rated as A or A-minus had regular jobs entering 2000; 6 of 47 (13%) were busts. Using the same two years, these numbers for players rated B-plus are 27 of 62 (44%) and 15 of 62 (24%), respectively. There are more successes and failures for the older groups.

Lack of Second Base Prospects

The lack of second base prospects could be due to the fact that more talented young infielders generally start out at shortstop and move to second only when their range or arm prevents them from remaining at short. Some of the better second basemen in the game started out as shortstops, e.g., Edgardo Alfonzo, Roberto Alomar, Damion Easley, and Pokey Reese. This is just a theory right now and also a potential area of further study.

Pitchers: Lefties vs Righties

Of the 66 pitchers in the study, 24 (36%) were in the regular/star/superstar categories entering 2000, while 6 (9%) were considered busts. That breaks down as follows. For righthanders, 22 of 53 (42%) were regulars or better, while 5 (9%) were busts. For lefties, the numbers were 2 of 12 (17%) and 1 of 12 (8%), respectively.

I'm reluctant to jump to any conclusions from a sample of only 12 for the southpaws other than it's possible that a disproportionately small number of high-ceiling lefties exist (which would partially explain their value). Billy Wagner and Eric Milton were the two who'd made it in this study but if we ran the same study after the 2000 season, we'd add Bruce Chen and Rick Ankiel to the list, which doubles the number (34%). If we did the same for righthanders, we'd add A.J. Burnett, Ramon Ortiz, and Brad Penny, and subtract Roy Halladay; the number would increase from 22 to 24 (45%).

I'm inclined to believe that the apparent wide discrepancy between lefties and righties is a fluke based on the fact that there are comparatively few high-ceiling southpaws.

Hitters vs Pitchers

Of hitters as a group, 48 of 131 (37%) fall into the regular/star/superstar categories and 13 of 131 (10%) into the bust category. Overall, surprisingly there's not a lot of difference in success rates between B-plus or better hitting and pitching prospects.

            N   Super   Star    Reg       Fringe    Prosp     Susp     Bust
Hitters   131   5 (4%)  7 (5%)  36 (27%)  14 (11%)  44 (34%)  11 (8%)  11 (8%)
Pitchers   65   1 (2%)  5 (8%)  18 (28%)   7 (11%)  24 (37%)   2 (3%)   6 (9%)

From these numbers, Sickels' top pitching prospects and hitting prospects have almost identical chances of reaching and sticking in the big leagues in some capacity. They also have roughly the same chance to completely flame out. It's limited data, to be sure, but perhaps top-flight pitching prospects aren't as much of a risk as we'd previously thought.

Suggestions for Further Study

Other things that might be interesting and/or useful to look at include the following:

• pedigree: were higher-round picks more likely to succeed than lower-round picks (how about foreign free agent signings)?
• how Sickels' prognosticating ability measures up to that of others, e.g., Baseball America
• how long it takes top prospects to reach regular, star, and superstar status
• what all this data looks like for less highly touted (i.e., B to C-minus) prospects